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CoNFLIC'l' OF LAws-WnoNGFUL DEATH-Surr BY FoREIGN AnMINis-

TRATon-Plaintiff, an administrator appointed by an Illinois probate court,
brought suit in Michigan under the Indiana death act1 to recover for the wrongful death of decedent which resulted from an accident occurring in Indiana.
The trial court sustained defendant's motion to dismiss on the ground that
plaintiff had no standing to sue in a Michigan court. Held, reversed. The
rule barring actions brought by foreign administrators does not apply to suits
brought under the usual type of wrongful death act. Howard v. Pulver, (Mich.

1951) 45 N.W. (2d) 530.
It is well settled that, absent statute, an administrator or executor cannot sue
in his representative capacity in a state other than that of his appointment without first obtaining ancillary letters.2 In theory this rule is supported by the
fact that the appointing court, from which the personal representative derives
his authority, has no jurisdiction over the assets of a decedent in a foreign state;3
but the underlying, and probably sole,4 reason for adherence to the rule is the
desire of the courts to conserve the decedent's assets for the benefit of local credit01s.5 Where the administrator sues for the benefit of decedent's estate so that
creditors do have an interest in the funds recovered, there would seem to be, at
least, some merit in giving the forum control over him by requiring ancillary

1 "When the death of one is caused by the wrongful act or omission of another, the
action shall be commenced by the personal representative of the decedent within two (2)
years, and the damages ••• shall inure to the exclusive benefit of the widow or widower, as
the case may be, and to the dependent children, if any, or dependent next of kin, to be
distributed in the same manner as the personal property of the deceased." Ind. Stat. Ann.
(Burns, 1946 Replacement) §2-404.
2 GooDRICH, CoNFLICT oF LAws, 3d ed., §185 (1949); STOMBERG, CoNFLICT oF
LAws, 2d ed., 443 (1951). For a collection of statutes permitting such actions under certain circumstances see 50 CoL. L. REv. 518 at 519, n. 3 (1950).
•
s 21 AM. Jun., Executors and Administrators §860 (1939).
4 Ghilain v. Couture, 84 N.H. 48, 146 A. 395 (1929).
5 Boulden v. Pennsylvania Ry. Co., 205 Pa. 264, 54 A. 906 (1903); Demattei v.
Missouri-Kansas-Texas Ry. Co., 345 Mo. 1136, 139 S.W. (2d) 504 (1940); Wiener v.
Specific Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 298 N.Y. 346, 83 ·N.E. (2d) 673 (1949); GooDRICH,
CoNFLICT oF LAws, 3d ed., §104 (1949); STUMllERG, CoNFLICT oF LAws, 2d ed., 194
(1951).
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letters or the appointment of a local representative. 6 However, where suit is
brought under the usual wrongful death act, both the theory and the reason for
the rule collapse. The typical wrongful death act gives decedent's creditors no
interest whatsoever in the fund recovered. 7 Instead, recovery is sought for the
exclusive benefit of certain specified persons;8 the administrator derives his authority, not from the appointing court, but rather from the statute;9 and suit is
brought by the administrator as statutory trustee for the designated beneficiaries
and not as a representative of the decedent's estate. 10 While a few courts still
feel obliged to require local qualification before suit may be brought,11 the great
majority of courts, now joined by the Michigan court,12 have recognized the
hollowness of giving effect to a rule when the reason therefor has ceased to
exist.13 Moreover, by permitting a foreign administrator to sue on the strength
of his original letters, the possibility that the cause of action may be barred al-

6 Rose, "Foreign Enforcement of Actions for Wrongful Death," 33 MicH. L. RBv. 545
(1935); 48 MrcH. L. RBv. 520 (1950). But even here the rule has disadvantages, "for it
makes more difficult, cumbersome, and expensive the closing up of affairs of a man whose
interests were scattered across state lines. Where the estate is not a large one, the burden
is especially great." GoonmcH, CONFLICT OF LAws, 3d ed., §186 (1949).
7 The Indiana statute is typical in this respect. See note 1 supra.
8 Boulden v. Pennsylvania Ry. Co., 205 Pa. 264, 54 A. 906 (1903); Connor v. New
York, New Haven & Hartford Ry. Co., 28 R.I. 560, 68 A. 481 (1908); Ghilan v. Couture,
supra note 4.
9 Pearson v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., (D.C. Va. 1923) 286 F. 429; Henkel v. Hood,
49 N.M. 45, 156 P. (2d) 790 (1945); Wiener v. Specific Pharmaceuticals, Inc., supra
note 5. See 12 GA. B.J. 501 (1950).
10 Knight v. Moline, East Moline & Watertown Ry. Co., 160 Iowa 160, 140 N.W.
839 (1913); Kerr v. Basham, 62 S.D. 301, 252 N.W. 853 (1934); Demattei v. l\.1issouriKansas-Texas Ry. Co., 345 Mo. 1136, 139 S.W. (2d) 504 (1940).
11 The Princess Sophia, (D.C. Wash. 1929) 35 F. (2d) 736; Vassill's Admr. v.
Scarsella, '.?92 Ky. 153, 166 S.W. (2d) 64 (1942) (Apparently suit would have been
allowed had plaintiff given bond with a resident surety as required by statute); Boutillier
v. Wesinger, 322 Mass. 495, 78 N.E. (2d) 195 (1948) (But plaintiff's capacity to sue
was upheld because of defendant's failure to file a timely objection); Accord: CoNFLICT OF
LAws RBsTATEMENT §396 (1934). A West Virginia statute expressly prohibits suits
brought by foreign personal representatives. See Rybolt v. Jarrett, ( 4th Cir. 1940) 112 F.
(2d) 642. And the North Carolina court has interpreted its own wrongful death act as
requiring suit to be brought by a personal representative appointed in that state. Hall v.
Southern Ry. Co., 149 N.C. 108, 62 S.E. 899 (1908); Monfils v. Hazelwood, 218 N.C.
215, 10 S.E. (2d) 673 (1940), cert. den. 312 U.S. 684, 61 S.Ct. 612 (1941).
12 A federal district court, sitting in Michigan, ,had already permitted suit by a foreign
administrator. Sivering v. Lee, (D.C. Mich. 1950) 90 F. Supp. 659.
13 Gulf, M. & N. Ry. Co. v. Wood, 164 Miss. 765, 146 S. 298 (1933); Cooper v.
American Airlines, Inc., (2d Cir. 1945) 149 F. (2d) 355; La May v. Maddox, (D.C. Va.
1946) 68 F. Supp. 25; Wallan v. Rankin, (9th Cir. 1949) 173 F. (2d) 488; Janes v.
Sackman Bros. Co., (2d Cir. 1949) 177 F. (2d) 928. See also cases cited notes 8-10 supra.
Similarly, foreign administrators are usually permitted to sue under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act. La Salle Nat. Bank v. Pennsylvania Ry. Co., (D.C. lli. 1948) 8 F.R.D. 316;
Scott v. New York, C. & St. L. Ry. Co., (7th Cir. 1947) 159 F. (2d) 618; Briggs v.
Pennsylvania Ry. Co., (2d Cir. 1946) 153 F. (2d) 841. Contra: Brown v. Boston & Maine
Ry., 283 Mass. 192, 186 N.E. 59 (1933).
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together by the short statutes of limitations usually involved in wrongful death
actions14 or by an inability to obtain ancillary letters15 is substantially lessened.

Douglas L. Mann, S.Ed.

14 Generally, the period within which wrongful death actions must be brought is one
or two years. Should it take longer than this to learn that the foreign administrator lacks
capacity to sue, it will then be too late to substitute an administrator appointed at the forum.
Such was the result in Hall v. Southern Ry. Co., 149 N.C. 108, 62 S.E. 899 (1908).
15 See Connor v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Ry. Co., 28 R.I. 560, 68 A. 481
(1908); Southern Ry. Co. v. Moore, 158 S.C. 446, 155 S.E. 740 (1930); Chicago, Indianapolis & Louisville Ry. Co. v. Hemstock, 102 Ind. App. 654, 4 N.E. (2d) 677 (1936).

